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Abstract
We present evidence against the standard assumptions that social preferences are stable
and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner. We nd evidence that measures
of social preferences can a¤ect subsequent behavior. Researchers often measure social
preferences by posing dictator type allocation decisions. The Social Value Orientation
(SVO) is a particular sequence of dictator decisions. We vary the order in which the
SVO and a larger stakes dictator game are presented. We also vary the form of the
dictator game. In one study, we employ the standard dictator game, and in the other,
we employ a nonstandard dictator game. With the standard dictator game, we nd that
prosocial subjects act even more prosocially when the SVO is administered rst, whereas
selsh subjects are una¤ected by the order. With the nonstandard dictator game, we nd
evidence across all subjects that those who rst receive the SVO are more generous in the
dictator game but we do not nd the e¤ect among only the generous subjects. Across
both dictator game forms, we nd evidence that the subjects who are rst given the SVO
were more generous than subjects who are given the SVO last. We also nd that this
e¤ect is stronger among the subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO measure. Although
we cannot determine whether the order a¤ects preferences or the measure of preferences,
our results are incompatible with the assumptions that social preferences are stable and
can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner.
JEL classication: C91, D64, Z13
Keywords: experimental economics, altruism, dictator game, social value orientation, order
e¤ects
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1 Introduction
It is commonly assumed that subjects have stable preferences over outcomes. It is also com-
monly assumed that standard techniques to measure these preferences are reliable and can be
performed in a nonintrusive manner. If these two assumptions hold then the order in which we
perform measurement of the preferences should not a¤ect the subsequent observations. How-
ever, we present evidence which challenges these assumptions. In particular, we nd evidence
that measures of social preferences can a¤ect subsequent behavior.
It is signicant if a systematic violation of these assumptions is found. Measures of pref-
erences are of interest primarily because they are helpful in making predictions regarding
behavior. However, if the outcome of a measurement can a¤ect future outcomes, either be-
cause preferences are not stable or because the measure is not reliable, then the value of the
measure is diminished.
In order to investigate whether the order of the measurement can a¤ect the outcome of the
measures, we o¤er an extremely simple experimental setup: we o¤er subjects two standard
measures but vary the order of their presentation. One might be tempted investigate these
order issues with a measure of social preferences and play in a strategic game (for instance,
the prisoners dilemma). However, if the experimenter observed that the relationship between
the measure and behavior in the game is a¤ected by the order in which the items are given,
this di¤erence is not exclusively attributable to the order of the measures. This is because
behavior in a strategic game is not exclusively a function of preferences but also, for instance,
expectations regarding the behavior of others. Therefore, rather than directing subjects to
play a strategic game, we o¤er two similar, commonly-used measures of social preferences, and
vary the order in which they are presented to the subjects. By doing this, we are condent
that the e¤ects which we nd are not due to the more complicated features involved in the
play of a strategic game.
It has been known for some time that many subjects do not simply maximize their own
material payo¤s.1 Specically, it is often observed that some subjects will sacrice their own
1For an early example, see Deutsch (1958).
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material payo¤s so that other subjects will receive a better material outcome. Researchers
often attempt to infer the nature of these social preferences by posing a series of allocation
decisions, often referred to as dictator games.2 These decisions entail a choice of an allocation
of hypothetical or material outcomes distributed between the subject and another subject. One
measurement technique is to simply pose a dictator game to a subject. Another measurement
technique, which involves a specic sequence of dictator games, is the Social Value Orientation
(SVO).
In our experiment, we vary the order of the SVO and a standard, lager stakes dictator
game. While we nd that SVO outcomes are signicantly related to outcomes in the dictator
game, we also nd that the mappings between these outcomes are related to the order in
which they are given. Specically, we nd that the subjects, for whom the SVO indicates
prosocial preferences, act even more prosocially in the larger stakes dictator game when the
SVO is administered rst. By contrast, we nd that the subjects for whom SVO indicates
selsh preferences are una¤ected by the order. We also nd that subjects with a perfectly
consistent SVO measure are more generous in the dictator game when they are rst given the
SVO measure.
To better understand these results we run an identical experiment, with the exception
that the dictator game exhibits a relative price of each allocation of 1-to-3, rather than the
standard 1-to-1. In other words, each $0.50 kept by the subject reduces the recipients payo¤s
by $1.50. In this case, we nd no signicant di¤erence between the prosocials who complete
the SVO before the dictator game and the prosocials who complete the SVO after the dictator
game. However, across all subjects we nd that those who rst complete the SVO are more
generous in the dictator game than subjects who complete the SVO last. Further, we nd
that this e¤ect is stronger when we restrict attention to those with a perfectly consistent SVO
measure.
Given the results of our experiment, we are unable to distinguish between the explanation
that the measurement a¤ects the social preferences of the subject or that the measure a¤ects
2For more on dictator games, see Forsythe et al. (1994), Ho¤man et al. (1994), Eckel and Grossman (1996),
Ru­ e (1998), and Bolton et al. (1998).
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the subsequent performance of another measure. Although we cannot distinguish between
these two explanations, we can conclude that, given the assumptions commonly applied to
experiments, we should not observe the behavior found in this experiment. The results of
our experiment suggest that standard techniques of measuring social preferences can inuence
subsequent behavior. Further, as we have uncovered a systematic relationship between the
treatment, the action of the subjects, and the measure, we therefore describe our results as
endogenous rather than unstable.
1.1 Social Value Orientation as a Measure of Social Preferences
We use SVO because it is relatively easy to administer and interpret. The specic technique
which we use, adapted from Van Lange et al. (1997), consists of 9 items with three possible
choices involving material payo¤s accruing to the subject and another subject.3 Each of the
nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response and a competitive response.
The individualistic response is the one in which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are
the largest. In other words, selecting the individualistic choice suggests that the subject
neither positively nor negatively values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
The prosocial response is the one in which the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both
the subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial response
suggests that the subject positively values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
The competitive response is the one in which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s
accruing to the subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the
competitive choice suggests that the subject negatively values the material payo¤s accruing
to the other subject.
Further, there is much written on the stability of SVO. For instance, Bogaert et al. (2008)
suggest that over the 40 years since its introduction by Messick and McClintock (1968), SVO
has been widely regarded as providing a stable measure of a personality trait. However, recent
work has suggested instances where SVO can be a¤ected by the setting and is thereby a less
than perfectly stable measure. Iedema and Poppe (1994) show that the measurement of SVO
3See the appendix for a complete description of the SVO items which we use.
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can be a¤ected by self-presentation e¤ects. Smeesters et al. (2003) show that priming certain
types of behavior can lead to a di¤erent mapping from SVO to behavior.4 While SVO is
considered relatively stable, to our knowledge there is no work suggesting that outcomes of
SVO can a¤ect subsequent outcomes.
It is obviously problematic that the order of the measurement of preferences might a¤ect
the relationship between the measure and behavior related to the measure. A measure is
primarily useful to the extent that it can form a basis for making predictions about behavior.5
When behavior and the measure of preferences are functions not exclusively of preferences
then the usefulness of the measure is somewhat degraded.
SVO also appears in the economics literature.6 However each of these papers uses the
ring measure (Griesinger and Livingston, 1973), which is slightly di¤erent than the technique
which we employ. The ring measure consists of 24 pair-wise items, rather than 9 items with
3 responses.7 However, similar to the technique which we employ, the ultimate objective is
to classify subjects on the basis of their social preferences. Relatively little is known about
the relationship between the ring measure and the measure which we employ (Bogaert et al.,
2008). However, we opt for the latter as it requires fewer responses and, in our opinion, is
more transparent. As a result, we conjecture that the e¤ects which we nd would only be
strengthened by the use of the ring measure.
Finally, measuring social preferences via dictator games, like SVO, has the advantage that
it only considers a situation where strategic issues are absent. Although all decisions would be
made in the absence of the feedback of the actions of other dictators, it still remains possible
that the subject would anticipate some implicit reciprocal arrangement. Therefore, similar
to Carpenter (2005), we employ a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation
involving self and another dictator. This other dictator does not decide on an allocation
4Also see Au and Kwong (2004), and Hertel and Fiedler (1994, 1998).
5SVO has been used to study behavior in games (Parks, 1994; Kramer et al., 1986; Pruyn and Riezehos,
2001), the decision to use public transportation (Van Vugt et al., 1996), proenvironmental behavior (Cameron
et al., 1998; Joireman et al., 2001), and volunteerism (McClintock and Allison, 1989).
6See Buckley et al. (2001), Buckley et al. (2003), Burlando and Guala (2005), Carpenter (2003), Carpenter
(2005), Cornelissen et al. (2007), Kanagaretnam et al. (2009), and O¤erman et al. (1996).
7Sonnemans et al. (2006) uses a visual representation of the ring whereby the subject selects their location
on the ring with a single click rather than responding to 24 items.
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involving the original dictator but rather on a third dictator.
1.2 Other Measures of Social Preferences
Another commonly used social preference measurement technique was developed by Andreoni
and Miller (2002). SVO is similar to this technique in that both pose a series of dictator
games however there remain important di¤erences. In Andreoni and Miller, choice is much
less restricted than in SVO. Each SVO item has only three possible responses, whereas in
Andreoni and Miller each item seeks an allocation of tokens ranging from 40 to 100. As a
result, Andreoni and Miller yields less coarse data than does SVO. However, the choice in
Andreoni and Miller is less transparent than SVO, as the latter explicitly lists the material
allocation of each choice. We are not aware of a study which compares the relative merits of
SVO and that proposed by Andreoni and Miller.
Charness and Rabin (2002) pose a series of simple games to learn the specic form of social
preferences related to relative wealth and reciprocity.8 The nature of the social preferences
might depend on whether others payo¤s are higher than or lower than the subjects own
payo¤s, therefore Charness and Rabin vary this aspect of their items. By contrast, in SVO
the subject decides among choices where monetary payo¤s accruing to oneself are never less
than that accruing to the other subject. Also, in contrast to the technique employed by
Charness and Rabin, SVO is not equipped to evaluate preferences for reciprocity.
1.3 Endogenous Social Preferences and Behavioral Spillovers
Consider the relationship between our paper and research on endogenous social preferences.9
For instance, Carpenter (2005) and Canegallo et al. (2008) investigate how the strategic envi-
ronment can a¤ect preferences.10 Also, Güth et al. (2008) nd that subjects who contribute
8Chen and Li (2009) perform a similar type of analysis when considering the type, or identity, of the other
subject.
9Brosig et al. (2007) examine the stability of social preferences across an extended period of time and nd
evidence of stability only among selsh subjects. Blanco et al. (2011) do not nd evidence of stability of social
preferences across simple games. In contrast, de Oliveira et al. (2008) nd evidence of consistency between
altruistic behavior in the eld and in the laboratory.
10Schotter et al. (1996) examines the e¤ect of framing on judgements of fairness and is therefore related to
endogenous preferences. Eckel and Grossman (2005) nd that a strong identity manipulation can induce more
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more in a public goods game are signicantly more trusting in a subsequent investment game.
By contrast, we study whether the decision in a commonly used measure of social preferences
can a¤ect subsequent behavior.11
Borgloh et al. (2010) is perhaps closest to our paper. The authors describe an experiment
where subjects are given an unfamiliar measure of altruism and a familiar measure, where the
authors vary the order of the measures. The authors nd evidence that the order a¤ects the
behavior in the unfamiliar task but not in the familiar task. Likewise, we vary the order of
tasks and examine the di¤erences in behavior.
In our view, the our results are best described as endogenous. First, we nd evidence that
social preferences are not merely unstable, but that their measure can systematically a¤ect
subsequent behavior. Second, we note that in the research mentioned above, the environment
a¤ects either preferences or the measure of preferences. We also note that within this literature,
a unique word has not emerged as a description of this behavior. However, the word endogenous
does appear prominently in many descriptions,12 and we therefore argue that it is the most
appropriate description of our observations.
1.4 Framing E¤ects and Order E¤ects
The present paper shares some features with the framing e¤ects literature. For instance, it has
been found that the there can be systematic di¤erences in the responses to questions based on
how the questions are framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).13 Like the framing literature,
the present paper appears to provide evidence against the assumptions that preferences are
stable and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner. However, unlike the framing
literature, the e¤ects which we nd persist after the initial "frame" and this persistence seems
to be based, at least in part, upon the actions of the subject. Specically, in Study 1 we nd
cooperation in public goods game. Also, see Bowles (1998), Poulsen and Poulsen (2006) and Isoni et al. (2011)
for more on endogenous preferences.
11There also exists a strand of literature which examines the role of the environment on play in games. See
Bednar et al. (2012), Bednar and Page (2007), Crawford and Broseta (1998), Savikhina and Sheremeta (2012),
and Van Hyuck et al. (1993).
12For instance, see Bowles (1998), Carpenter (2005), and Poulsen and Poulsen (2006)
13For more on the framing e¤ects, see Frisch (1993). For evidence that framing e¤ects can occur in subjects
where one would expect otherwise, see Gächter et al. (2009).
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that prosocial subjects are a¤ected by the order and in both studies we nd that the consistent
subjects are a¤ected by the order.
Our paper also relates to the order e¤ects literature, which nds evidence that the order
of the questions can a¤ect the answers. Research has found that the question order can a¤ect
the answers to self-reported health questions (Bowling and Windsor, 2008), identication with
a racial or ethnic group (Mallett et al., 2011), self-reported interest in politics and religion
(McFarland, 1981), satisfaction with public services (Van de Walle and Van Ryzin, 2011), and
even preferences for soft drinks (Welch and Swift, 1992).14 Although these papers suggest
that the order is likely to a¤ect the responses in our setting, they are not helpful in suggesting
hypotheses regarding the direction of the e¤ect. Specically, the literature discusses reasons
for the order e¤ects which they identify (fatigue, improved familiarity, priming, saliency, etc.)
however none would seem to uniquely suggest a direction of the e¤ect. First, the experiment
is relatively brief and simple, and we would therefore not expect fatigue or familiarity to a¤ect
the results. Second, we are essentially asking the same question twice: measurement of social
preferences via SVO and via the dictator game. As a result, based on the reasons provided in
the literature, it is not clear to us in which direction we should expect the change. Does the
SVO prime subjects to be selsh or generous? Do selsh actions in the SVO prime subjects to
be less selsh or more selsh in the dictator game? Does the consistency of the responses in
the SVO a¤ect the dictator game choice? Our experiments suggest that the answer to these
questions can depend on the form of the dictator game and the nature of the actions selected
by the subject.
2 Study 1
2.1 Overview
We seek to test whether outcomes of a measure of social preferences can a¤ect subsequent
measurements. Therefore, we direct subjects to complete the SVO and make an allocation in
a standard dictator game, however we vary the order in which these are given to the subjects.
14See Schwarz (1999) for an overview.
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2.2 Procedure
A total of 95 students enrolled in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United
States participated. The study was conducted in 5 classes of 16, 20, 39, 12, and 8 subjects.15
The responses were entered on paper. The subjects were given course credit for attendance
and were told that a randomly selected 25% from each session would be paid the amount
earned in the experiment. The subjects completed the SVO and decided on an allocation in
a standard $10 dictator game. The allocation of the $10 was presented in $0.25 increments.
The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 41 dictator game allocations they most
preferred. See Appendix 1 for the format of the dictator game.
The subjects were aware of the triadic design as they were told to make allocation decisions
involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2")
was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each
subject was that which was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did
not keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. As a result, the amount accruing to each
subject was a function of their own actions, and the actions of another subject who was not
a¤ected by their actions. In both the SVO and dictator game, the status of You, Other1 and
Other2 remained xed. This description of the triadic design was provided verbally by the
same male experimenter and in written form given to each subject. The written instructions
are provided in Appendix 1.16
The SVO entailed the exact nine items from Van Lange et al. (1997). The subjects were
presented with three items on each of three pages. In Van Lange et al., the subjects decided on
an allocation of points which carry no nancial implications. By contrast, in our experiment
subjects are o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money, whereby the subject is e¤ectively
deciding on an allocation of a small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO items, the subject
15We exluded a single subject because the subject did not complete the study.
16The triadic design does not require that each session has a number of subjects which is divisible by three.
Within each session, every subject was assigned a subject identication number. After the session, we randomly
selected a number between 1 and the number of subjects in the session minus one. We then matched each
subject with an Other1 by nding the subject with an identication number which is equal to the original
identication number plus the random number. The Other2 was determined to be the subject with the next
highest identication number as the Other1. In this way, each subject could be assigned a unique Other1 and
Other2, without requiring that the data occur in multiples of three.
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could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO items, the subject
could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were not told these
amounts, however they could be easily calculated. The SVO items and the conversion from
points to money are given in Appendix 1.
Within each of the 5 classes, approximately half of the subjects answered the SVO items
then made a choice in the dictator game. We refer to this treatment as SVO First. Approxi-
mately half of each class responded to the dictator game then answered the SVO items. We
refer to this treatment as SVO Last. Within each session, we randomly assigned subjects into
one of these two treatments.
The subjects completed the experiment without feedback. In other words, each subject
completed the experiment without knowing what the other subjects selected. Finally, we note
that have data on the gender and age of the subjects.
2.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects, which is the sum of the amount kept in the
SVO and the amount kept in the dictator game, ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average
of $7.09.17 The total amount accruing to the subjects, which is the sum of what was kept
by the subject and what was sent by Other2, ranged from $2.51 to $21.93, with an average
of $11.69. Female participants accounted for 37% of the subjects. The average age was 21.8
with a standard deviation of 5.56. Also note that we do not nd signicant di¤erences in the
amount kept in the dictator game or in the SVO classication among the ve sessions.
Using the procedure of Van Lange et al. (1997), we categorized 31 subjects (33%) as
prosocials, 39 subjects (41%) as individualists and 5 subjects (5%) as competitors. There
were 20 subjects (21%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6
choices of a particular type. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to
SVO categorization and the treatment.
17See Bohnet and Frey (1999), and Cox and Sadiraj (2012) for other papers with dictator game choices in
which some subjects exhibit similar levels of generosity.
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Table 1: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and treatment
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 14 24 3 8 49
SVO Last 17 15 2 12 46
Total 31 39 5 20 95
As one would expect, there is a signicant relationship between the SVO measure and
choice in the dictator game. According to a Wilcoxon test, the prosocial subjects (M = 4:67;
SD = 1:63) kept signicantly less than did the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects
(M = 7:28; SD = 2:48), W (73) = 714:5; Z = 5:07; p < 0:001.
An SVO measure equaling 9 indicates perfect consistency in the set of responses and a
measure of 6, 7, or 8 indicates a less than perfectly consistent set of responses. See Table 2 for
the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and consistency.
Table 2: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO
classication and consistency of measurement
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO of 9 4:31 7:95
(1:69) (2:12)
SVO of 6; 7; or 8 5:89 6:12
(0:45) (2:11)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9 (24 subjects)
kept a signicantly smaller share than those with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, W (29) = 186:5;
Z = 4:09; p < 0:001. Also, among the subjects classied as individualistic, those with a
measure equal to 9 (26 subjects) kept a signicantly larger share than those with a measure
of 6, 7, or 8, W (37) = 190:0; Z = 2:12; p = 0:034. Therefore, we are reasonably condent in
the relationship between choice in the SVO and choice in the dictator game.
We now compare dictator allocations given the treatment. First, the di¤erence between
the amount kept in the SVO First treatment (M = $6:04; SD = 2:89) and in the SVO Last
treatment (M = $6:16; SD = 2:40) is not signicant, W (94) = 2167:5; Z = 0:30; p = 0:76.
However, signicant relationships emerge when one looks within SVO classications. See
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Table 3 for a summary of the amounts kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and
treatment.
Table 3: Average amount kept in dictator game
by SVO classication and treatment
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 4:14 7:38
(2:28) (2:23)
SVO Last 5:10 7:28
(0:55) (2:40)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
We run regressions with a dependent variable of the amount kept in the dictator game.
Since this variable is bounded, we use tobit regressions, with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 0.18 We also employ the variable Prosocial which indicates the number of prosocial
responses in the SVO. This variable can range from 0 to 9. We use the Prosocial variable
because there are only a few competitive subjects.19 When the analysis includes subjects of
each SVO classication, the SVO treatment is not signicantly related to the amount kept in
the dictator game. As a result, we perform the following analysis while restricting attention
to a subset of the subjects. In regressions (1) and (2) we restrict attention to the 31 subjects
who were classied as prosocial. In regressions (3) and (4) we restrict attention to the subjects
with an SVO prosocial measure of 9. Finally, in regressions (5) and (6) we restrict attention
to the subjects with an SVO measure equaling 9. Note that this outcome indicates perfect
consistency for prosocials, competitors, and individualists. In regressions (5) and (6), the
Prosocial variable essentially becomes a dummy variable. See Table 4 for a summary of the
analysis.
18Note that Borgloh et al. (2010) also use tobits in order to account for the bounded choice data.
19The results are similar, although slightly weaker, if instead we employ a dummy variable indicating that
the subject was classied as prosocial by the SVO.
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Table 4: Results of tobit regressions with amount kept in the dictator game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SVO First  1:02  0:897  1:42  1:27  1:48  1:47
(0:565) (0:523) (0:715) (0:690) (0:869) (0:835)
Prosocial  0:575  0:525      0:532  0:521
(0:261) (0:240) (0:0981) (0:0941)
Female   1:221   1:44   1:707
(0:556) (0:720) (0:859)
Age    0:108    0:0935   0:0199
(0:0726) (0:0910) (0:0730)
Observations 31 31 24 24 53 53
Log Likelihood  56:66  54:00  45:51  43:52  106:04  103:96
Note: The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound of 10 and a
lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:1.
We rst note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is signicant at the 0.1 level in regressions (1),
(2), (4), (5), (6), and signicant at the 0.05 level in regression (3). The estimates in regressions
(1)-(4) suggest that the prosocial subjects who are rst given the SVO, are more generous in
the dictator game. The estimates in regressions (5) and (6) suggest that all subjects with a
perfectly consistent measure on the SVO act more generously in the dictator game.
We note that we did not list the analysis which includes the interaction between the SVO
First and Prosocial variables because in these specications the estimate is not signicant.
We also note interesting results related to gender and generosity. Regressions (2), (4) and
(6) suggest that within these subsets, female participants can be less generous than male
subjects. When one performs the analysis for all data points, the female coe¢ cient is no
longer signicant.
3 Study 2
3.1 Overview
Roughly, Study 1 nds that prosocial subjects act even more prosocially in the dictator game
when the SVO items are administered rst. We also nd that subjects who are rst given
the SVO and have a perfectly consistent measure are more generous in the dictator game
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than are subjects who are given the SVO last and have a perfectly consistent measure. Based
on the data available from Study 1, it is not clear to us what drives this result. In the
dictator game, unlike the SVO, the subject cannot a¤ect the total amount to be allocated.
It is possible that the decisions which increase this total amount by the prosocial subjects in
the SVO First treatment predisposes them to be more generous in the dictator game when
compared to prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. If this was the case, and if the dictator
game was designed so that the dictator game also a¤ected the total amount to be allocated
then the results in the SVO Last treatment would converge to that of the SVO First treatment.
However, it is also possible that with the standard dictator game, being selsh was too easy
and so the individualists are not a¤ected by the order. If this is the case, and if the dictator
game is designed in a manner in which being selsh is more costly then we expect a divergence
of the results of the SVO First and Last treatments of the individualists. In Study 2, we hope
to shed some light on the relative merit of these two explanations.
Study 2 follows the same procedure as Study 1 with the exception that, rather than using
a standard dictator game, we use a dictator game in which the relative allocation price is
1-to-3. In other words, the most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most
generous allocation is $0 to self and $30 to other. This nonstandard dictator game has the
advantages that the amount of total amount to be allocated is a matter of choice and being
selsh is relatively more costly.
3.2 Procedure
A total of 90 students in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United States
participated. Study 2 was conducted in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16, and 11 subjects. The procedures
in Study 2 are identical to that in Study 1 with the exception of the form of the dictator game.
Rather than the standard dictator game, in which the trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other
payo¤s is 1-to-1, the dictator game used in Study 2 has a trade-o¤ of 1-to-3. In other words,
to increase the amount kept by $0.50, the subjects must reduce the amount sent to the other
subject by $1.50. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the other
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subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which
of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred. See Appendix 1 for the format of this
dictator game.
3.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average
of $8.17. The total amount accruing to the subjects ranged from $1.13 to $42.00, with an
average of $17.36. Also note that we do not nd signicant di¤erences in the amount kept
in the dictator game or in the SVO classication among the four sessions. Finally, we do not
have data on the gender or age of a single subject. As a result, any analysis employing these
variables will contain one fewer observation than the analysis without. Female participants
accounted for 34% of the subjects. The average age was 22.4 with a standard deviation of
4.86.
Again using the procedure of Van Lange et al. (1997), we categorized 44 subjects (49%)
as prosocials, 34 subjects (38%) as individualists and 4 subjects (4%) as competitors. There
were 8 subjects (9%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices
of a particular type. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to SVO
categorization and the treatment.
Table 5: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and treatment
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 21 16 2 5 44
SVO Last 23 18 2 3 46
Total 44 34 4 8 90
Similar to Study 1, we nd a signicant relationship between choice in the SVO and
choice in the dictator game. The prosocial subjects (M = 6:44; SD = 2:79) kept signicantly
less than did the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 8:28; SD = 2:33),
W (80) = 2069:5; Z = 4:78; p < 0:001. As in Study 1, we nd that the consistency of the SVO
is related to the choice in the dictator game. See Table 6 for the amount kept across both
treatments by the consistency of the SVO.
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Table 6: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO
classication and consistency of measurement
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO of 9 5:97 8:38
(3:11) (2:37)
SVO of 6; 7, or 8 7:46 7:94
(1:57) (2:53)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9 (30 subjects) kept a
smaller share than subjects with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, W (42) = 386:5; Z = 2:08; p = 0:038.
However, in contrast to Study 1, among those classied as individualistic, subjects with a
measure equal to 9 (17 subjects) did not keep a signicantly di¤erent amount than subjects
with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, W (32) = 283:5; Z = 0:48; p = 0:63.
Finally, we may ask whether the order matters for the dictator game in Study 2. See Table
7 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and treatment.
Table 7: Average amount kept in dictator
game by SVO classication and treatment
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 5:98 8:00
(3:18) (2:54)
SVO Last 6:87 8:31
(2:36) (2:38)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
Unlike in Study 1, here we nd evidence that the order treatment is related to the amount
kept in the dictator game across all subjects. We perform tobit regressions, similar to the
analysis summarized in Table 4, across all subjects. Again note that the tobit regressions em-
ployed an upper bound of 10 and a lower bound of 0. Regression (1) excludes the demographic
data (gender and age) and regression (2) includes these variables. This analysis is summarized
in Table 8.
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Table 8: Results of tobit regressions with
amount kept in the dictator game
(1) (2)
SVO First  1:455  1:573
(0:736) (0:731)
Prosocial  0:369  0:384
(0:0969) (0:0964)
Female   1:114
(0:769)
Age   0:0223
(0:0735)
Observations 90 89
Log Likelihood  198:27  194:70
Note: The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound of 10 and a
lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05.
We note that the SVO First variable is signicant at 0.05 in regressions (1) and (2). This
provides evidence that subjects who are rst given the SVO measure are more generous in the
dictator game than are subjects who are given the SVO measure last. We contrast the results
summarized in Table 8 with that in Study 1. In Study 1 we did not nd a relationship across
all subjects between the order treatment and behavior in the dictator game.
Next we perform an analysis similar to that summarized in Table 4, where we run tobit
regressions on subsets of the Study 2 data. Regressions (1) and (2) are restricted to subjects
who were classied as prosocial. In regressions (3) and (4) we restrict attention to subjects
with an SVO prosocial measure of 9. Finally, regressions (5) and (6) restrict attention to the
subjects with an SVO measure of 9. These results are summarized in Table 9.
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Table 9: Results of tobit regressions with amount kept in the dictator game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SVO First  0:966  1:177  1:34  2:03  2:07  2:92
(0:961) (0:945) (1:44) (1:41) (1:10) (1:12)
Prosocial  1:03  0:889      0:427  0:432
(0:532) (0:523) (0:128) (0:123)
Female   1:711   2:73   1:741
(0:988) (1:49) (1:192)
Age   0:0148   0:162   0:221
(0:0795) (0:178) (0:149)
Observations 44 43 30 29 49 48
Log Likelihood  102:32  98:47  72:06  67:30  106:89  101:72
Note: The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound of 10 and a
lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and * indicates
signicance at p < 0:1.
First, we note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is not signicant in regressions (1)-(4). This
implies that, unlike the results in Study 1, here we do not nd evidence that the order treat-
ment a¤ects behavior in the dictator game among the prosocial subjects. However, as we do in
Study 1, we nd a relationship among those with a perfectly consistent SVO measure, between
the order treatment and generosity in the dictator game. Indeed, this variable is signicant
at 0.01 in regression (6).
Again, we note that the interaction terms between the SVO First variable and the SVO
outcomes are not signicant. We also have performed an analysis similar to that in regressions
(1)-(4) but with individualistic subjects. One might have expected the SVO First variable to
be signicant however we do not nd a signicant relationship.
4 Pooled Data
Here we analyze the pooled data obtained in Studies 1 and 2. While Study 1 and Study 2 were
conducted at di¤erent times and on di¤erent subjects, their procedures are identical with the
exception of the format of the dictator game. In order to account for these di¤erences in the
dictator game, we employ the fraction of money kept in the dictator game as the dependent
variable. In each of the regressions below, we include a dummy variable, Normal Dictator
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game which obtains a value of 1 for the dictator game used in Study 1 and 0 otherwise. We
also use the interaction between the Normal Dictator variable and the SVO First variable.
In regressions (1) and (2) we perform the analysis on all of the subjects in both studies.
Regressions (3) and (4) restrict attention to the prosocial subjects in both studies. Finally,
in regressions (5) and (6) we restrict attention to subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO
measure. This analysis is summarized in Table 10.
Table 10: Results of tobit regressions with fraction kept in the dictator game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SVO First  0:101  0:106  0:0862  0:0946  0:168  0:195
(0:0475) (0:0477) (0:0502) (0:0496) (0:0645) (0:0649)
Prosocial  0:0449  0:0453  0:0739  0:0698  0:0516  0:0519
(0:00638) (0:00640) (0:0254) (0:0250) (0:00739) (0:00728)
Female   0:0472   0:104   0:135
(0:0494) (0:0521) (0:0684)
Age   0:00370    0:00205   0:00689
(0:00471) (0:00485) (0:00720)
Normal Dictator 0:0216 0:0258 0:0200 0:0237 0:0505 0:0499
(0:0477) (0:0478) (0:0507) (0:0500) (0:0643) (0:0633)
Observations 185 184 75 74 102 101
Log Likelihood  86:54  85:77  7:24  5:66  48:30  45:48
Note: The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound of 10 and a
lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:1.
We note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is signicant across subjects in both studies. In
particular, the results of regressions (1) and (2) suggest that subjects who rst receive the
SVO are more generous in the dictator game than are subjects who receive the SVO last. We
also note that, when restricting attention to only prosocial subjects, the SVO First variable is
signicant only at 0.1. Next we note that the SVO First variable is signicant at 0.01 in both
regressions (5) and (6).
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5 Discussion
In Study 1, we found that prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment kept signicantly less
in the standard dictator game than prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. We also found that
the subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO measure were more generous than subjects with
a less than perfectly consistent measure. In Study 2, we found that, across all subjects, those
who were given the SVO measure rst were more generous in the dictator game. And similar
to that found in the analysis of Study 1, we found that subjects with a perfectly consistent
SVO measure were a¤ected by the order. However, we did not nd evidence that the prosocial
subjects were a¤ected by the order. When we pool the data across studies, we nd evidence
that subjects who were given the SVO measure rst, were more generous in the dictator game,
and that this e¤ect was stronger among those with a perfectly consistent SVO measure.
There seem to be two e¤ects related to the order of the measures. First, prosocial subjects
are di¤erentially a¤ected by the order in Study 1 but not Study 2. This is consistent with the
explanation that prosocials who rst complete the SVO have their generosity made salient by
their decision to increase the total amount to be allocated. As a result, these subjects are more
generous in the dictator game than prosocials who have not yet completed the SVO. However,
once both the SVO and the dictator game entail the decision to increase the total amount
to be allocated, as it does in Study 2, the e¤ect diminishes. The second e¤ect relates to the
generosity exhibited by all subjects, particularly the consistent subjects, who rst receive the
SVO measure. Indeed, the pooled data suggests that, across both dictator game versions, the
subjects who were rst given the SVO act more generously than those who were given the
dictator game last. This is compatible with the explanation that the measurement of SVO
can prompt subjects of all social preferences, particularly those with perfectly consistent SVO
measures, to be more generous. This e¤ect can become stronger when being selsh is more
costly, as it is in Study 2.
Our results could partially be explained by wealth e¤ects, whereby subjects who have
completed the SVO were a¤ected the money earned. However, we point out that SVO accounts
for a very small amount of money, and it seems rather implausible that a change in wealth
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of $0.12 would a¤ect behavior in a $10 dictator game. Further, the wealth e¤ect argument is
not consistent with the di¤erential e¤ects related to the measure of consistency of the SVO
measure, since this includes prosocials, individualists, and competitors.
At this point it is natural to wonder why the analysis focused on the endogeneity of the
behavior in the dictator game and not that in the SVO. There are two reasons for this.
First, the dictator game was more highly incentivized than the SVO and we therefore are
more interested in the former than the latter. However, we also note that we are not able to
identify the analogous SVO behavior. In other words, we were not able to identify evidence
that the order of the measures a¤ected behavior in the SVO.
6 Concluding Comments
In this paper, we describe two studies in which we measure social preferences through choice
in the Social Value Orientation (SVO) and choice in a dictator game. In Study 1, we vary the
order of the SVO and a standard dictator game. We nd evidence that subjects with prosocial
preferences act more generously in the dictator game when the SVO items are given rst. On
the other hand, we do not nd evidence that subjects with individualistic preferences are
a¤ected by the order of the items. However, we do nd that subjects with perfectly consistent
SVO measures are a¤ected by the order of the measurement.
To better understand these results, Study 2 performs the identical procedure of Study
1 with the exception that a nonstandard dictator game is used. This nonstandard dictator
game exhibits a 1-to-3 trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s, whereas the standard
dictator game has a 1-to-1 trade-o¤. We nd that the order a¤ects behavior in the dictator
game, and this e¤ect is larger for subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO measure.
Using pooled data from Study 1 and Study 2, we nd that subjects who were rst given
the SVO, regardless of their SVO measure, are more generous than subjects who were given
the SVO last. We also nd that this e¤ect is particularly strong for subjects with a consistent
response in the SVO measure. We note that the results of Study 1, Study 2 and the pooled
data, call into question the assumptions that social preferences are stable and that they can
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be measured in a reliable and nonintrusive manner. In particular, we nd that measures of
social preferences can a¤ect subsequent behavior.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the present experimental design. For instance,
we cannot determine whether the SVO measurement a¤ects the dictator game choices, the
dictator game choices a¤ects the SVO measurement or perhaps both. Such questions of
endogeneity are notoriously tricky and would require further study. It is also unclear if the
order matters in the measurement of preferences via Andreoni-Miller, Charness-Rabin, or
Chen-Li techniques. Finally, SVO only measures social preferences when the subject receives
a larger share than the other subject. The signicance of this detail is not clear. Hopefully,
future work will shed light on these issues.
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Appendix 1
 We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et al., 1997) in order to measure the
SVO of the subjects.
 Each of the 9 items has a prosocial answer, a individualistic answer and a competitive
answer.
 Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to $0.02103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
Question 8 A B C
You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
 The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A, and 9C.
 The prosocial answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C, and 9B.
 The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C, 3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B, and 9A.
 Van Lange et al. (1997) classies a subject according to the above labels if six or more
items are answered according to the above.
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Instructions given to each subject:
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Study 1 Dictator Game:
25
Study 2 Dictator Game:
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